The Harvard University Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research (HPCR) is offering a Senior Security Management Workshop in cooperation with the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) in Geneva, Switzerland. The course is part of the Security Management Initiative (SMI).
The registration form for the event can be downloaded here.
Showing posts with label Security. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Security. Show all posts
Sunday, October 14, 2007
AFGHANISTANICA - Afghanistan’s Security Deterioration in Visual and Quantitative Form
AFGHANISTANICA has a great compilation post looking at Afghanistan’s Security Deterioration in Visual and Quantitative Form.

The post makes clear that the UNDSS report is very focused on the security of humanitarian aid worker:
'The report makes it obvious that the “Anti-Government Elements” aren’t giving aid workers any special treatment. Incidents in 2007 up to early August:
Aid convoys attacked/ambushed/looted: 41.
Aid facilities attacked looted: 29.
Aid workers abducted: 69 (44 Afghans, 25 international).
Later killed by captors: 7 (5 Afghans, 2 foreigners).
Total aid workers killed: 41 (34 Afghans, 7 international).
These numbers are of course much less than deaths suffered by Afghan civilians, police and military and less than the losses by foreign troops. But these NGO workers are desperately needed in Afghanistan, and many of them need to be out in the field to be effective.'

The post makes clear that the UNDSS report is very focused on the security of humanitarian aid worker:
'The report makes it obvious that the “Anti-Government Elements” aren’t giving aid workers any special treatment. Incidents in 2007 up to early August:
Aid convoys attacked/ambushed/looted: 41.
Aid facilities attacked looted: 29.
Aid workers abducted: 69 (44 Afghans, 25 international).
Later killed by captors: 7 (5 Afghans, 2 foreigners).
Total aid workers killed: 41 (34 Afghans, 7 international).
These numbers are of course much less than deaths suffered by Afghan civilians, police and military and less than the losses by foreign troops. But these NGO workers are desperately needed in Afghanistan, and many of them need to be out in the field to be effective.'
Monday, October 01, 2007
Sudan- Peacekeepers Look for Missing in Darfur
There are numerous articles chronicling a rebel attack on an African Union base in Haskanita, northern Darfur yesterday. Apparently 1,000 rebel gunmen overwhelmed the base and its 150 troops before dawn. At least 10 peackeepers have been killed, and between 20 and 50 are still missing.

The rebels looted vehicles and ammunition, and it took Sudanese government troops to chase them away. Photos show government troops looting the leftovers, and burnt armoured vehicles. A quote from an anonymous officer underlines the stakes for the AU Force:
'"It may not be the right political thing to say, but the government forces saved us," said an AU officer, who also asked not to be named because of military regulations.'
The IHT published the first obvious article on the future of Darfur and peacekeeping, namely, whether this tragic incident won't un-nerve other nations considering contributing to the more robust hybrid AU-UN force for Darfur. A spokeman for OXFAM framed the attack in light of the kinds of threats that humanitarian agencies are facing:
'"It's indicative of the complete insecurity," said Alun McDonald, a spokesman for the Oxfam aid organization in Sudan. "These groups are attacking anybody and everybody with total impunity."
McDonald added that armed groups were "increasingly targeting aid workers to steal their vehicles, radios and logistical stuff."
He said the attack on the peacekeepers "sounds quite similar to that, just on a much larger scale."'

The rebels looted vehicles and ammunition, and it took Sudanese government troops to chase them away. Photos show government troops looting the leftovers, and burnt armoured vehicles. A quote from an anonymous officer underlines the stakes for the AU Force:
'"It may not be the right political thing to say, but the government forces saved us," said an AU officer, who also asked not to be named because of military regulations.'
The IHT published the first obvious article on the future of Darfur and peacekeeping, namely, whether this tragic incident won't un-nerve other nations considering contributing to the more robust hybrid AU-UN force for Darfur. A spokeman for OXFAM framed the attack in light of the kinds of threats that humanitarian agencies are facing:
'"It's indicative of the complete insecurity," said Alun McDonald, a spokesman for the Oxfam aid organization in Sudan. "These groups are attacking anybody and everybody with total impunity."
McDonald added that armed groups were "increasingly targeting aid workers to steal their vehicles, radios and logistical stuff."
He said the attack on the peacekeepers "sounds quite similar to that, just on a much larger scale."'

Tuesday, September 25, 2007
Sudan Advises Aid Agencies to Accept Military Escort Offer
VOA reports that the Sudanese government is warning UN agencies and aid groups that they should accept military escorts to travel through the Darfur region. This offer follows a day after OXFAM reported they would consider withdrawal from Darfur if the security situation did not improve.
Monday, September 24, 2007
UNAMA- Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan, 2001-2007
The United Nations Mission to Afghanistan has published an overview of Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan, 2001- 2007.
The paper notes that suicide attacks remain an alien phenomenon in Afghanistan. UNAMA has set out to raise awareness on the impact of the continuing conflict on Afghan civilians, and highlights that the victims of suicide attacks around 80% civilian. As has been reported elsewhere, the study notes that the death toll has remained relatively low, given the general ineptness of the bombers themselves.
The resulting guidelines revert to the typically big-picture ambitions associated with the Afghanistan nation-building project.
Immediate efforts are needed to diminish perceptions of a foreign military occupation:
- the counter insurgency forces must reduce civilian casualties and conscientiously work to uphold the dignity and honour of Afghans, to avoid provoking an outraged population into volunteering for jihad
- the Afghan national forces must be supported to increasingly assume responsibility for the provision of more effective security
- means must be found to engage other Muslim countries to help provide security and reconstruction in Afghanistan
Military approaches alone may have only marginal short-term impacts. Immediate political efforts are needed to undermine, contain and even constrict the insurgents’ support base. This will require the Afghan Government to:
- meet the demands of the population whose concerns and frustrations might otherwise drive them embrace the armed resistance
- reduce corruption, oversee fair judicial processes and focus on the provision of public services
- engage all relevant civil society groups - including religious authorities - to build a consensus against suicide attacks and their perpetrators. However, for such civil society actors to step up, their safety must be ensured
Eliminate suicide attacks cells through a mix of law and order, military operations and engagement:
- efforts must be made to compel volunteers to reject violence and adopt more constructive forces of change
- insurgents should be encouraged to express their grievances through political and democratic means
Address the cross border dimension of suicide attacks in Afghanistan:
- Pakistani supportiveness is required to eliminate domestic support for the insurgency in Afghanistan, to address militancy within its own borders, to reform governance in the tribal areas and invest in development
- the international community should encourage Pakistan and Afghanistan to embark upon a process through which all outstanding bilateral concerns are addressed and eventually resolved
The paper notes that suicide attacks remain an alien phenomenon in Afghanistan. UNAMA has set out to raise awareness on the impact of the continuing conflict on Afghan civilians, and highlights that the victims of suicide attacks around 80% civilian. As has been reported elsewhere, the study notes that the death toll has remained relatively low, given the general ineptness of the bombers themselves.
The resulting guidelines revert to the typically big-picture ambitions associated with the Afghanistan nation-building project.
Immediate efforts are needed to diminish perceptions of a foreign military occupation:
- the counter insurgency forces must reduce civilian casualties and conscientiously work to uphold the dignity and honour of Afghans, to avoid provoking an outraged population into volunteering for jihad
- the Afghan national forces must be supported to increasingly assume responsibility for the provision of more effective security
- means must be found to engage other Muslim countries to help provide security and reconstruction in Afghanistan
Military approaches alone may have only marginal short-term impacts. Immediate political efforts are needed to undermine, contain and even constrict the insurgents’ support base. This will require the Afghan Government to:
- meet the demands of the population whose concerns and frustrations might otherwise drive them embrace the armed resistance
- reduce corruption, oversee fair judicial processes and focus on the provision of public services
- engage all relevant civil society groups - including religious authorities - to build a consensus against suicide attacks and their perpetrators. However, for such civil society actors to step up, their safety must be ensured
Eliminate suicide attacks cells through a mix of law and order, military operations and engagement:
- efforts must be made to compel volunteers to reject violence and adopt more constructive forces of change
- insurgents should be encouraged to express their grievances through political and democratic means
Address the cross border dimension of suicide attacks in Afghanistan:
- Pakistani supportiveness is required to eliminate domestic support for the insurgency in Afghanistan, to address militancy within its own borders, to reform governance in the tribal areas and invest in development
- the international community should encourage Pakistan and Afghanistan to embark upon a process through which all outstanding bilateral concerns are addressed and eventually resolved
Standoff with Taliban leaves big Afghan dam project in limbo - International Herald Tribune
IHT has a great article on the seemingly desperate efforts to bring stability to Helmand Province via reconstruction projects. The cycle seems like that experienced in Iraq: initial attempts were made with a variety of largely private sector actors; insurgents/rebels starting direct attacks on the projects; civilian operators fled, and now a militarized USAID project does all it can to try and rebuild under fire.

Thursday, August 09, 2007
Afghanistan- NGOs question new government directive on armed escorts IRIN Asia | Asia | Afghanistan | AFGHANISTAN: NGOs question new government directive on armed escorts | Governance Conflict Aid Policy | News Item
'Afghanistan’s Ministry of Interior has ordered Afghan security forces not to allow foreign aid workers to travel outside Kabul without an armed escort.'
In the aftermath of the ongoing hostage crises in Afghanistan, the move was probably inevitable, as are the reactions by NGOs:
'...The Afghan security authorities have repeatedly requested all foreign aid workers to seek their advice before travelling beyond Kabul city.
“We would not be facing the current crisis if the Koreans had informed us about their travel plans in advance,” said Zemarai Bashari, a spokesman for the Interior Ministry (MoI). “We could have provided them with an armed escort for their protection,” he added.
The government of Afghanistan has expressed it readiness to provide armed police escorts for international staff who would like to drive out of the capital, officials said.
However, representatives of local and international NGOs have dubbed the government’s extra security measures “disproportionate” and “counterproductive”.
“Armed escorts will undoubtedly make NGOs a legitimate target for anti-government elements,” said Hashim Mayar, deputy director of ACBAR - a coordination umbrella for NGOs in Afghanistan.
Mayar also said that in light of criticisms of widespread corruption and inefficiency within the MoI, many NGOs fear disclosing an advanced itinerary to the Afghan police, fearing it would increase possible risks.
Matt Waldman, an adviser to the UK charity Oxfam, said: “Whilst we understand the reasons for this move, we believe it is disproportionate and could have adverse consequences for development works, particularly in rural areas.”'
Disproportionate does seem to characterize many aspects of this story. In particular, how many agencies were truly working far outside the relative safety of Kabul (or other urban centres...) and as such would truly be affected by this travel restriction- if we can even call it that- ?
In the aftermath of the ongoing hostage crises in Afghanistan, the move was probably inevitable, as are the reactions by NGOs:
'...The Afghan security authorities have repeatedly requested all foreign aid workers to seek their advice before travelling beyond Kabul city.
“We would not be facing the current crisis if the Koreans had informed us about their travel plans in advance,” said Zemarai Bashari, a spokesman for the Interior Ministry (MoI). “We could have provided them with an armed escort for their protection,” he added.
The government of Afghanistan has expressed it readiness to provide armed police escorts for international staff who would like to drive out of the capital, officials said.
However, representatives of local and international NGOs have dubbed the government’s extra security measures “disproportionate” and “counterproductive”.
“Armed escorts will undoubtedly make NGOs a legitimate target for anti-government elements,” said Hashim Mayar, deputy director of ACBAR - a coordination umbrella for NGOs in Afghanistan.
Mayar also said that in light of criticisms of widespread corruption and inefficiency within the MoI, many NGOs fear disclosing an advanced itinerary to the Afghan police, fearing it would increase possible risks.
Matt Waldman, an adviser to the UK charity Oxfam, said: “Whilst we understand the reasons for this move, we believe it is disproportionate and could have adverse consequences for development works, particularly in rural areas.”'
Disproportionate does seem to characterize many aspects of this story. In particular, how many agencies were truly working far outside the relative safety of Kabul (or other urban centres...) and as such would truly be affected by this travel restriction- if we can even call it that- ?
Wednesday, August 08, 2007
SOMALIA: Call for agencies to scale up aid operations in capital
UN official makes the call for aid agencies to step up their activities in Somalia, taking advantage of military escorts and protected compounds in Somalia:
'A senior UN official has urged humanitarian agencies to take advantage of security provided by African Union troops in Mogadishu to improve the delivery of aid to tens of thousands of displaced people camped in surrounding areas.
"Response [to the crisis] has not been adequate because of difficulties of access and too many security incidents," Eric Laroche, the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia, said on 2 August, a day after a visit to Mogadishu.
Aid agencies should be mobilised to scale up their operations in the Somali capital, he said, adding that this would help get relief supplies both to the city and the surrounding areas.
He said the availability of African Union security escorts facilitated his visit to Mogadishu and the Afgoye.
"We are starting to have access and we need to use it," Laroche said. "If we can operate from Mogadishu, we can reach more people."'
'A senior UN official has urged humanitarian agencies to take advantage of security provided by African Union troops in Mogadishu to improve the delivery of aid to tens of thousands of displaced people camped in surrounding areas.
"Response [to the crisis] has not been adequate because of difficulties of access and too many security incidents," Eric Laroche, the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia, said on 2 August, a day after a visit to Mogadishu.
Aid agencies should be mobilised to scale up their operations in the Somali capital, he said, adding that this would help get relief supplies both to the city and the surrounding areas.
He said the availability of African Union security escorts facilitated his visit to Mogadishu and the Afgoye.
"We are starting to have access and we need to use it," Laroche said. "If we can operate from Mogadishu, we can reach more people."'
Wednesday, August 01, 2007
Haiti- UN Peacekeeping Force Evolving to a Policing Role

In the lead-up to the UN Secretary General's visit, Haiti is getting some long-merited attention. This AP article takes a balanced look at the challenges facing peacekeeping and peacebuilding in the Haitian state.
Haiti is in a transitional phase, where it is out of immediate crisis, but where, 'The senior U.N. envoy to Haiti says it is too soon for the U.N. to consider withdrawing its 8,800-strong, Brazil-led peacekeeping force, noting past failed attempts to help the country... "An early withdrawal right now would be a big mistake, 'Big' with a capital letter," Edmond Mulet said in a recent interview with The Associated Press. "This is a time to hold on, to make this work this time."'
The challenge is that UN military peacekeepers are obliged to undertake what is essentially a policing function. '... the U.N. mission eventually hopes to use more civilian police than soldiers but is hampered by a world shortage of trained, French-speaking officers... The peacekeepers provide more than 80 percent of Haiti's security needs, but the government is working to eventually take over that responsibility. The national police academy is pumping out hundreds of recruits, trying bolster the nation's small police force of 6,000.'
Chronic poverty and gangs, drug-traffickers still pose a threat to real peace and stability in Haiti, with official suggesting that a UN force will be need until President Preval's term ends in 2011.

Monday, July 30, 2007
Afghanistan: The World's Worst Suicide Bombers?
Our thanks to TIME for uncovering an excellent essay that asks whether, statistically speaking, the Afghans are not the world's worst suicide bombers?
An excerpt from the essay shows the science and helps us understand there is more than just some black humour at play here:
'Missing the Target
An analysis of the attacks carried out in the last two years reveals a curious fact. In 43% of the bombings conducted last year and in 26 of the 57 bombings traced in this study up to June 15, the only death caused by the bombing was that of the bomber himself. Astoundingly, approximately 90 suicide bombers in this two year period succeeded in killing only themselves. This number exceeds 100 when you factor in those who succeeded in killing only one person in addition to themselves. There was one period in the spring of 2006 (February 20 to June 21) when a stunning 26 of the 36 suicide bombers in Afghanistan (72%) only killed themselves. This puts the kill average for Afghan suicide bombers far below that of suicide bombers in other theaters of action in the area (Israel, Chechnya, Iraq and the Kurdish areas of Turkey). Such unusual bomber-to-victim death statistics are, of course, heartening for both coalition troops—who have described the Afghan suicide bombers as "amateurs"—and the Afghan people—who are usually the victims of the clumsy bombings.
These statistics also represent a uniquely Afghan phenomenon that warrants investigation. In the first portion of this study, it was demonstrated that a part of the reason for this low kill ratio lies in the Taliban's unique targeting sets (Terrorism Monitor, March 1). As Pashtuns with a strong code (Pashtunwali) that glorifies acts of martial valor and badal (revenge), the Afghan suicide bombers are more prone to hit "hard" military targets than callously obliterate innocent civilians in the Iraqi fashion. On the rare occasions where there have been high casualty bombings of Afghan civilians, they tend to have been carried out by Arab al-Qaeda bombers.'
An excerpt from the essay shows the science and helps us understand there is more than just some black humour at play here:
'Missing the Target
An analysis of the attacks carried out in the last two years reveals a curious fact. In 43% of the bombings conducted last year and in 26 of the 57 bombings traced in this study up to June 15, the only death caused by the bombing was that of the bomber himself. Astoundingly, approximately 90 suicide bombers in this two year period succeeded in killing only themselves. This number exceeds 100 when you factor in those who succeeded in killing only one person in addition to themselves. There was one period in the spring of 2006 (February 20 to June 21) when a stunning 26 of the 36 suicide bombers in Afghanistan (72%) only killed themselves. This puts the kill average for Afghan suicide bombers far below that of suicide bombers in other theaters of action in the area (Israel, Chechnya, Iraq and the Kurdish areas of Turkey). Such unusual bomber-to-victim death statistics are, of course, heartening for both coalition troops—who have described the Afghan suicide bombers as "amateurs"—and the Afghan people—who are usually the victims of the clumsy bombings.
These statistics also represent a uniquely Afghan phenomenon that warrants investigation. In the first portion of this study, it was demonstrated that a part of the reason for this low kill ratio lies in the Taliban's unique targeting sets (Terrorism Monitor, March 1). As Pashtuns with a strong code (Pashtunwali) that glorifies acts of martial valor and badal (revenge), the Afghan suicide bombers are more prone to hit "hard" military targets than callously obliterate innocent civilians in the Iraqi fashion. On the rare occasions where there have been high casualty bombings of Afghan civilians, they tend to have been carried out by Arab al-Qaeda bombers.'
Friday, July 20, 2007
Iraq- Danish army evacuates 200 Iraqis
BBC reports that the Danish military has secretly airlifted out 200 Iraqis who had been employed as aides and translators to Danish armed forces serving in Iraq. This is a pleasant surprise, to see armed forces at once rewarding the service of their national staff, while recognizing that such service could put same staff at mortal risk. One only assumes that the families of such staff were also evacuated. The Danish contingent will soon leave Iraq, ending Denmark's contribution to MNFI.
This action stands in stark contrast to the US and UK, who have been- to be polite- 'reluctant' to carry out similar protection of staff whose employment with their forces have put their lives at risk.
Update: a more recent article has the top US diplomat in Iraq proposing to grant immigrant visas to the US to all Iraqis working with the Americans.
This action stands in stark contrast to the US and UK, who have been- to be polite- 'reluctant' to carry out similar protection of staff whose employment with their forces have put their lives at risk.
Update: a more recent article has the top US diplomat in Iraq proposing to grant immigrant visas to the US to all Iraqis working with the Americans.
Thursday, July 19, 2007
Lebanon- Peacekeeping with Hizballah's Help | TIME
TIME has an excellent piece on the challenges facing the relatively successful UNIFIL mission in Lebanon. The peacekeepers are apparently being forced to 'shake hands with the devil'- in order to improve their force protection, and reduce further threats from yet another metaphoric devil. The suggestion is that UNIFIL is obliged to maintain contacts with Hizbollah, in order to protect themselves from further Al-Qaeda attacks:
'The contingents comprising the peacekeeping force known as UNIFIL have good cause for concern. Last month, six Spanish and Colombian UNIFIL soldiers were killed in a bomb ambush, the deadliest attack against the peacekeeping mission in its 29-year history. In a video message released this week, Al-Qaeda deputy leader Ayman al-Zawahiri hailed the attack as "a response against those invading Crusader forces who were occupying a beloved part of the land of Islam". And, UNIFIL officials fear, given the worsening security situation in Lebanon, there could be more attacks on the way. "The major difficulty we are going to face for sure is this kind of terrorist attack because even if we have no idea yet who could be the perpetrators... another attack can come," Major General Claudio Graziano, UNIFIL's commander, told TIME in an interview at his headquarters in the southern coastal village of Naqoura.'
Whatever contacts may exist between UNIFIL and Hizbollah, there was also another roadside bomb that struck a peacekeeping vehicle, the second such incident in a month.
'The contingents comprising the peacekeeping force known as UNIFIL have good cause for concern. Last month, six Spanish and Colombian UNIFIL soldiers were killed in a bomb ambush, the deadliest attack against the peacekeeping mission in its 29-year history. In a video message released this week, Al-Qaeda deputy leader Ayman al-Zawahiri hailed the attack as "a response against those invading Crusader forces who were occupying a beloved part of the land of Islam". And, UNIFIL officials fear, given the worsening security situation in Lebanon, there could be more attacks on the way. "The major difficulty we are going to face for sure is this kind of terrorist attack because even if we have no idea yet who could be the perpetrators... another attack can come," Major General Claudio Graziano, UNIFIL's commander, told TIME in an interview at his headquarters in the southern coastal village of Naqoura.'
Whatever contacts may exist between UNIFIL and Hizbollah, there was also another roadside bomb that struck a peacekeeping vehicle, the second such incident in a month.
Sunday, July 08, 2007
Insight: Threats keep U.S. diplomats bottled up
The Columbus Dispatch ran provides insight on the direct and indirect effects of security restrictions on US diplomats.
Responding to threats abroad, US diplomats have quite evidently been obliged to adopt meaures to mitigate the risks, ranging from severe travel restrictions, to bunkering themselves into 'fortress-like compounds'. These measures affect embassies and consuls in 28 countries currently. To give soe scope to the restrictions: mission where employees receive danger pay has soared from 2 to 26 since the 1980's. Non-family missions, from 10 to 21.
These changes are having a clear 'operational impact': '"Security concerns have forced embassies to close publicly accessible facilities and curtail certain public outreach efforts, sending the unintended message that the United States is unapproachable," it said in the little-publicized April 26 report.
An internal review by the State Department in 2005 concluded that security concerns "often require a low-profile approach during events, programs or other situations, which, in happier times, would have been able to generate considerable good will for the United States."'
The indirect effects continue beyond negative perceptions of the US government- it is manifest primarily in the difficulty to recruit new staff, or to find staff willing to serve in higher-risk areas.
These insights can be constrasted with the realities of a separate article announcing the the re-opening of a US Diplomatic Unit in Guinea-Bissau, West Africa. There the intersection of internal security concerns and national security interests is better expressed: 'With its lawless, island-dotted Atlantic shoreline, Guinea-Bissau has become a major hub for smuggled Colombian cocaine on its way to lucrative markets in Europe and elsewhere, prompting calls for international action to stem the trade.... The instability, along with high-level corruption, makes it fertile ground for drugs and gangs, security experts say.'
Thanks to the Security Management Initiative for the post.
Responding to threats abroad, US diplomats have quite evidently been obliged to adopt meaures to mitigate the risks, ranging from severe travel restrictions, to bunkering themselves into 'fortress-like compounds'. These measures affect embassies and consuls in 28 countries currently. To give soe scope to the restrictions: mission where employees receive danger pay has soared from 2 to 26 since the 1980's. Non-family missions, from 10 to 21.
These changes are having a clear 'operational impact': '"Security concerns have forced embassies to close publicly accessible facilities and curtail certain public outreach efforts, sending the unintended message that the United States is unapproachable," it said in the little-publicized April 26 report.
An internal review by the State Department in 2005 concluded that security concerns "often require a low-profile approach during events, programs or other situations, which, in happier times, would have been able to generate considerable good will for the United States."'
The indirect effects continue beyond negative perceptions of the US government- it is manifest primarily in the difficulty to recruit new staff, or to find staff willing to serve in higher-risk areas.
These insights can be constrasted with the realities of a separate article announcing the the re-opening of a US Diplomatic Unit in Guinea-Bissau, West Africa. There the intersection of internal security concerns and national security interests is better expressed: 'With its lawless, island-dotted Atlantic shoreline, Guinea-Bissau has become a major hub for smuggled Colombian cocaine on its way to lucrative markets in Europe and elsewhere, prompting calls for international action to stem the trade.... The instability, along with high-level corruption, makes it fertile ground for drugs and gangs, security experts say.'
Thanks to the Security Management Initiative for the post.
Sunday, June 24, 2007
Incident- 4 killed in attack on UNIFIL patrol in south Lebanon

Update: further articles on 25 June confirmed that 5 were killed, and strong suspicions that it was a targeted car bomb attack. No one has claimed responsibility for the attack, which took place in a region under the effective control of Hezbollah.
Monday, June 18, 2007
Blast targetting US troops and contractors kills 4 in Afghan capital
Sunday saw another suicide bomber targetting US military personnel and American contract workers travelling by convoy in Kabul. Four civilians were killed in the blast, with one further killed and wounded by a US soldider opening fire after the blast. 'The American soldier in a Humvee "mistakenly" opened fire on the crowd after the suicide attack, killing one civilian and wounding three, said Zalmai Khan, deputy Kabul police chief.'
Friday, June 15, 2007
Overview- Darfur's aid lifeline in danger
CSN has a good snapshot piece of the situation in Darfur, and the challenges facing aid agencies. The article is short on specifics but picks the key elements of the degrading situation and a few illustrations of the risks. While the claim is made that 'security is degrading' no concrete indications are given. The article closes with the suggestion that agencies are 'wondering' if it's time to pull back to the relative safety of the cities- the author seems to have missed the mark, the vast majority of agencies are only operating in IDP camps in and around the major cities of the Darfurs.
Thursday, May 10, 2007
Afghanistan- Revived Taliban restrict Afghan aid effort
CS Monitor has a provocative article attempting to equate the military successes of the Taliban with restriction on aid and development in Afghanistan.
Against the backdrop of NATO troops giving out candy, the author highlights the difficulties that donors are having in finding Afghan NGOs to implement projects in volatile regions. Presumably the search for Afghan partners is now the tactic of choice to make up for the absence of international partners, who are unable to work without armed security. But even this approach is apparently failing, as the Afghan NGOs are explaining the same problems that their international counter-parts have faced since 2001:
'...finding Afghan aid agencies who are willing to work on projects in outlying southern districts has become a thorny problem – especially in areas where international troops visit districts to inspect aid work, such as the canal-clearing project in Niki Kaz.
"When they [NATO soldiers] monitor the projects themselves, they come with tanks, with weapons, and this affects our staff badly," says Abdul Salaam Siddiqi, the deputy director of the Voluntary Association for the Rehabilitation of Afghanistan (VARA).
Mr. Siddiqi says his agency has rolled back its activities steadily over the past two years and now operates only in provincial capitals in the south.
Delivering aid in outlying districts has become impossible, and eight staff members have been killed since 2002.
"We face many problems. The Taliban have arrested our engineers there and captured our vehicles," he explains.'
Against the backdrop of NATO troops giving out candy, the author highlights the difficulties that donors are having in finding Afghan NGOs to implement projects in volatile regions. Presumably the search for Afghan partners is now the tactic of choice to make up for the absence of international partners, who are unable to work without armed security. But even this approach is apparently failing, as the Afghan NGOs are explaining the same problems that their international counter-parts have faced since 2001:
'...finding Afghan aid agencies who are willing to work on projects in outlying southern districts has become a thorny problem – especially in areas where international troops visit districts to inspect aid work, such as the canal-clearing project in Niki Kaz.
"When they [NATO soldiers] monitor the projects themselves, they come with tanks, with weapons, and this affects our staff badly," says Abdul Salaam Siddiqi, the deputy director of the Voluntary Association for the Rehabilitation of Afghanistan (VARA).
Mr. Siddiqi says his agency has rolled back its activities steadily over the past two years and now operates only in provincial capitals in the south.
Delivering aid in outlying districts has become impossible, and eight staff members have been killed since 2002.
"We face many problems. The Taliban have arrested our engineers there and captured our vehicles," he explains.'
Monday, April 16, 2007
Officer of the AU peacekeeping force killed in Darfur
An UNMIS officer was killed in what appears to be a car-jacking in west Darfur. His death brings the death toll to seven in the last month.

In related news, Senegal was considering the withdrawal of its troops, unless the African Union could do more to ensure their security. Senegal lost five of its soldiers in a recent attack.

In related news, Senegal was considering the withdrawal of its troops, unless the African Union could do more to ensure their security. Senegal lost five of its soldiers in a recent attack.
Wednesday, April 04, 2007
VOA- East Africa Drought, US troops in Djibouti dig wells, build schools, Feature Stories: East Africa Drought, US troops in Djibouti dig wells, build schools
Voice of America (VOA) ran an article yesterday on the work of US military forces based in the Horn of Africa.
One counter-point to the enthusiasm of the well-received US aid was that of Kenneth Bacon of NGO Refugees International:
"In rare and emergency cases it makes sense for the military to do what only it can do very quickly,” Bacon says. “On a day-to-day basis, I don't think it makes sense for the military to be out distributing aid, vaccinating kids, [and] drilling wells. These are things that can be done by other groups. They can be done much more cheaply and much more effectively by operations like Oxfam or Save the Children or International Rescue Committee or CARE."
One counter-point to the enthusiasm of the well-received US aid was that of Kenneth Bacon of NGO Refugees International:
"In rare and emergency cases it makes sense for the military to do what only it can do very quickly,” Bacon says. “On a day-to-day basis, I don't think it makes sense for the military to be out distributing aid, vaccinating kids, [and] drilling wells. These are things that can be done by other groups. They can be done much more cheaply and much more effectively by operations like Oxfam or Save the Children or International Rescue Committee or CARE."
Thursday, March 22, 2007
Iraqi insurgents blow up car with children inside | Iraq | Guardian Unlimited
The Guardian reports that US forces in Iraq were investigating a potentially new tactic on the part of insurgent in Iraq. In a recent incident, a car with children was allowed to pass an American checkpoint, before being detonated with the children still inside. It is thought to be the first incident where children have been used as 'decoys' to facilitate passage of a car bomb. Apparently the adults who would have driven the car fled before the detonation.
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