Training - UK Corridors of Power

The British Overseas NGO's for Development (BOND) is offering an innovative course entitle, 'UK Corridors of Power'. The course intends to:

'To develop participant's knowledge and understanding of the UK political process (Westminster and Whitehall) and improve their ability to navigate the UK policy-making arena.

A key skill that applies itself to a variety of NGO work is an understanding of the UK political process. Knowing how the decision-making process really works and how to get key political players on side, is vital if your advocacy is to change policy.'

While UK-focussed, the course is an interesting initiative to arm institutions and individuals on how to better arm themselves in promoting policy change with states.

Darfur - Peacekeepers Without a Peace to Keep

The New York Times has a short piece entitled, 'Peacekeepers Without a Peace to Keep'.

The article continues the debate on how damaging the attack on AU peacekeepers in Haskanita will be in the short- and mid-term. While this take on the incident isn't new, the author does start to pose some more critical questions about whether military intervention in Darfur is already too late?- Or, is it too early?

A recent statement by the AU force commander captured the challenge facing peackeepers- 'AU outnumbered, outgunned in Darfur'. It is easy to make calls for peacekeepers to enforce the 'Responsibility to Protect', as Roméo Dallaire does: '...the troops must “go inside the camps, do night patrols and snap inspections, essentially go wherever they need to, without the Sudanese Army or police blocking them.” He said they also need to go after “every one of those splinter groups” and they’ll need the proper gear to do so.' How realistic are these calls?

A number of uncomfortable comparisons in the article are made between Darfur and Somalia. Yet perhaps a better comparison would be the early days of UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia? The lack of political will in FRY crippled even relatively well-equipped peackeepers. Can UNAMID hope for better?

Coordinating Chaos - Peace and Conflict Society (PACS), Trudeau Centre for the Study of Peace and Conflict, University of Toronto

The Peace and Conflict Society (PACS) at the Trudeau Centre for the Study of Peace and Conflict at the University of Toronto is organizing a conference entitled 'Coordinating Choas' which might be of interest to readers.

'The Peace and Conflict Society’s third annual conference entitled Coordinating Chaos: Taking a Multi-Dimensional Approach to Stabilization Operations, focuses on the changing nature of humanitarian intervention and on how to integrate the multiple actors operating within conflict zones in order to foster a lasting peace. The conference seeks to advance the academic dialogue surrounding conflict intervention and to expand potential policy options available to global leaders whose decisions determine the fate of nations and directly impact global stability. Coordinating Chaos will examine the challenges of integrating political, military, economic, and humanitarian actors within conflict zones so as to develop coherent, multi-dimensional strategies for peace support and counterinsurgency operations.'

UN INSTRAW - Gender, Peace and Security- Gender Training for Peacekeepers

A good resource site that has a comprehensive overview of available gender training for peacekeepers. Curious to see how little is available in the Americas and East/South East Asia.

The International Geneva Peacebuilding Guide- An Inventory of Geneva-based capacity and expertise

A new resource was launched this week by the Geneva Centre for Security Policy:

'This conference presents the preliminary findings of an analytical mapping that was undertaken as an integral part of ‘The UN Peacebuilding Commission and International Geneva’ project. Since late 2005, the GCSP and its partners have organised a series of events and public discussions looking at the implications for International Geneva of the work of the UN Peacebuilding Commission. The project has been developed by the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) in collaboration with its partners, the Quaker United Nations Office in Geneva (QUNO), the Graduate Institute for International Studies (HEI/PSIS) and the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). Financial support has been provided by the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) and the Geneva International Academic Network (GIAN).

Since 2006, the project and its partners have engaged a broad range of International Geneva stakeholders in discussions, workshops and public events, aimed at examining the importance of peacebuilding, and the formation of the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). These events and discussions led to a number of findings and recommendations that looked at how International Geneva could influence peacebuilding issues including questions of financing, local ownership, civil society, expertise, analysis, networks and coordination. Please refer to Annex 3 for more details activities of the project to date.

To complement the ongoing discussions and events of 2006, it was decided to undertake an analytical mapping of the peacebuilding capacities and expertise of Geneva-based stakeholders. The results of this mapping have been made public in an online database, the ‘International Geneva Peacebuilding Guide’. This Guide allows users to conduct complex searches and filtering of the data collected from the mapping. The International Geneva Peacebuidlding Guide can be consulted at the following link: http://www.gcsp.ch/e/publications/IGPeaceProject/Guide/index.htm.

The preliminary findings of the project to date are included in this document, and offer a first glimpse of the data collected as of 09 September 2007. We are able to have a comprehensive look at the topography of the International Geneva peacebuilding landscape, the types of organisations present, the countries in which these organisations are engaged, the peacebuilding sectors in which they are active, and the types of activities they undertake. A total of 69 organisations have provided detailed information on on up to 3 peacebuilding sectors where they feel they have the greatest added value, and have also elaborated on how they engage in these priority sectors in the actual and potential PBC focus countries.'



The Guide can be accessed here.

UN praises Indian women police officers deployed in Liberia - Yahoo! India News

We posted earlier on the deployment of 125 Indian Para-military forces soliders to Liberia. Great to see that they are receiving well-deserved praise for their work:

'New York, Aug 19 (PTI) Indian women police officers - members of the first ever all female unit deployed by the UN - have come in for high praise from the world body's officials who commended their work in emergency situations as also in crime prevention in Liberia where they are posted.

As a mark of the appreciation, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's Special Representative Alan Doss decorated the officers - who have also been praised for their unflinching support to the National Police in Liberia (NPL) - with the UN Peacekeeping Medals at an impressive ceremony in the Liberian capital, Monrovia.

"Though a new beginning for gender equality in peacekeeping, this deployment is a continuation of India's consistent commitment to peacekeeping operations," Doss said. "All of you standing here represent a proud tradition of service to international peace." Also present at the ceremony were Force Commander Lt Gen Chikadibia Isaac Obiakor, Director of Administration Stephen Lieberman, the Inspector-General of the Liberia National Police Beatrice Munah Sieh, UNPOL Acting Commissioner, General Maritz Du Toit; the Consul-General of India Upjit Singh Sachdeva and other Government officials.

The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) is currently assisting the NPL to attract more women into the police.'

Iraq- Video: Inside the Surge

The Guardian's Sean Smith has a good short film on the surge in Iraq. Part II can be found here.

Afghanistan- Servicemembers Volunteer to Convoy Supplies to Needy Afghans

'Every other week, servicemembers from all branches of the military conduct convoys from this base to deliver clothing and supplies to needy Afghans in the surrounding areas. But they're not doing it because they have to. They're doing it because they want to help.

Members of the Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan unload a truck full of donations from the U.S. at a refugee camp outside of Kabul, Afghanistan. Photo by Air Force Master Sgt. Jim Varhegyi
(Click photo for screen-resolution image);high-resolution image available.
“These are military and coalition members who volunteer,” said Air Force Lt. Col. Michael Weber, Camp Eggers garrison chaplain. “They participate on their own time and at their own risk to do something good for the people of Afghanistan.”

The chaplains on Camp Eggers have organized the deliveries as part of a community relations program. Working with local religious leaders, as well as various government and relief agencies, the program organizers plan their missions to deliver aid to areas most in need of the assistance.'

US Civil Affairs- Peace Through Puppets

One article lead us to dig deeper into this phenomenon: Peace Through Puppets.



'The reaction was immediate when Army 1st Sgt. Bruce L. Reges strode into the classroom in the Baghdad suburb of Baqubah, in the volatile Diyala province.

At 6-foot-5 and wearing full body armor, Reges, 57, looked fearsome to the schoolchildren. Outside, two Stryker armored vehicles blocked the street. A heavily armed security detail was checking out the roof and other classrooms.

Reges is assigned to an Army civil affairs unit out of Fort Bragg, N.C., working to reconstruct and support schools, irrigation projects and honey farms in Diyala. The team was visiting the school to assess what could be done to help, but the young students were terrified.

"Two of the girls started to cry and escape somehow, and the teacher had to calm them down and tell them that we were there to help them, not to hurt them," Reges recalled. "It was emotionally tough for me to see a child so traumatized by U.S. soldiers that they reacted that way."'

You can guess at the rest of the article- an email to his mom, the inevitable shipment of handpuppets assembled by concerned mothers in Reston, Louisiana and now Civl Affairs soldiers in Afghanistan and Iraq are not to be found without a 'puppet in their pocket', so to speak. As with the best things in life, you can donoate money via PayPal on the website (20 USD = 12 soft puppets), in addition to enjoying photos of thoroughly softened US troops in body armor, wrap-around sunglasses and hand puppets... Other armed forces can seemingly request their own puppets with a simple mail to peacethrupuppets@aol.com.

Resource- Guidelines for Relations Between US Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations

The United States Institute of Peace launched their Guidelines for Relations Between US Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations on 24 July 2007.

Have pasted in the broad recommendations for armed forces and humanitarian agencies. Taken out of context, it might look a bit simplistic. There's much more in the guidelines, and the processes aspect is particularly well done. One can only guess at how difficult it was in finding 'lowest common denominators' for such a diverse audience. One can quickly find some issues of contention, such as: 'In situations in which there is no actor to servea as a bridge, a US military Civil Affairs cell could serve as a temporary point-of-contact between NGHOs and other elements of the US Armed Forces.' What about OCHA's CMCS?

To be seen how US stakeholders will implement this- and who will enforce it?

'On July 24, 2007, leaders of the U.S. military and NGO community celebrated a promising moment for civil-military relations in peace operations: the rollout of Guidelines that will serve as “rules of the road” for how the two entities operate in hostile environments.

Facilitated by the U.S. Institute of Peace, the Guidelines seek to mitigate frictions between military and NGO personnel over the preservation of humanitarian space in places like Afghanistan and Iraq. Principles in the Guidelines include ensuring that military personnel wear uniforms when conducting relief activities to avoid being mistaken for nongovernmental humanitarian organization representatives. Conversely, it recommends that humanitarian relief personnel avoid traveling in U.S. Armed Forces vehicles with the exception of liaison personnel to the extent practical.
The heads of both the U.S. military and InterAction (an umbrella organization for U.S. NGOs) have endorsed the Guidelines and will be disseminating them throughout their organizations. Two years in the making, the effort represents “a desire from both sides to move beyond polemics to proactive problem solving,” said Jeb Nadaner, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations at the Pentagon. NGO leaders likewise expressed optimism at the potential for change. “We do not want to understate the importance of this document for us,” said Sam Worthington, InterAction President and CEO. “We believe that these guidelines will serve a purpose beyond U.S. NGOs to our global partners.”

The initiative was launched in March 2005 when Amb. Carlos Pascual, Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization at the U.S. State Department, asked the Institute to establish a Working Group on Civil-Military Relations in Non-permissive Environments. What began as a dialogue between military and NGO leaders has resulted in a pioneering effort upon which both sides hope to expand. Military and NGO leaders intend to promulgate the Guidelines throughout their communities via media and education channels: NGOs will publish the Guidelines in their newsletters and literature; the military will incorporate the Guidelines into joint military doctrine publications. The next challenge lies in implementing the Guidelines in the field and creating a monitoring mechanism by which the Guidelines can be continuously tested and revised.


For the U.S. Armed Forces, the following guidelines should be observed consistent with military force protection, mission accomplishment, and operational requirements:

1. When conducting relief activities, military personnel should wear uniforms or other distinctive clothing to avoid being mis taken for NGHO representatives. U.S. Armed Forces personnel and units should not display NGHO logos on any military cloth ing, vehicles, or equipment. This does not preclude the appro priate use of symbols recognized under the law of war, such as a red cross, when appropriate. U.S. Armed Forces may use such symbols on military clothing, vehicles, and equipment in appropriate situations.
2. Visits by U.S. Armed Forces personnel to NGHO sites should be by prior arrangement.
3. U.S. Armed Forces should respect NGHO views on the bearing of arms within NGHO sites.
4. U.S. Armed Forces should give NGHOs the option of meeting with U.S. Armed Forces personnel outside military installations for information exchanges.
5. U.S. Armed Forces should not describe NGHOs as “force mul tipliers” or “partners” of the military, or in any other fashion.
6. U.S. Armed Forces personnel and units should avoid interfer ing with NGHO relief efforts directed toward segments of the civilian population that the military may regard as unfriendly.
7. U.S. Armed Forces personnel and units should respect the de sire of NGHOs not to serve as implementing partners for the military in conducting relief activities. However, individual NGOs may seek to cooperate with the military, in which case such cooperation will be carried out with due regard to avoid ing compromise of the security, safety, and independence of the NGHO community at large, NGHO representatives, or public perceptions of their independence.


For NGHOs, the following guidelines should be observed:

1. NGHO personnel should not wear military-style clothing. This is not meant to preclude NGHO personnel from wearing protec tive gear, such as helmets and protective vests, provided that such items are distinguishable in color/appearance from U.S. Armed Forces issue items.
2. NGHO travel in U.S. Armed Forces vehicles should be limited to liaison personnel to the extent practical.
3. NGHOs should not have facilities co-located with facilities in habited by U.S. Armed Forces personnel.
4. NGHOs should use their own logos on clothing, vehicles, and buildings when security conditions permit.
5. NGHO personnel’s visits to military facilities/sites should be by prior arrangement.
6. Except for liaison arrangements detailed in the sections that follow, NGHOs should minimize their activities at military bases and with U.S. Armed Forces personnel of a nature that might compromise their independence.
7. NGHOs may, as a last resort, request military protection for convoys delivering humanitarian assistance, take advantage of essential logistics support available only from the military, or accept evacuation assistance for medical treatment or to evacuate from a hostile environment. Provision of such mili tary support to NGHOs rests solely within the discretion of the military forces and will not be undertaken if it interferes with higher priority military activities. Support generally will be provided on a reimbursable basis in accordance with appli cable U.S. law.'

NATO, Afghanistan- Smaller bombs, fewer civilian casualties?

Seems the attempt to win good press around respecting IHL in Afghanistan isn't getting very far. Now the calculus seems to be, 'smaller bombs, fewer casualties'.

'NATO plans more restrained tactics in its war against Taliban guerrillas, including smaller bomb loads on aircraft, in an effort to cut civilian casualties, the alliance's head said in an interview published on Monday.

The Financial Times said NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer had acknowledged that mounting Afghan civilian casualties had hurt support for NATO, and had said commanders had ordered troops to hold off on attacks in some situations where civilians were at risk.

"We realise that, if we cannot neutralise our enemy today without harming civilians, our enemy will give us the opportunity tomorrow," the paper quoted him as saying in an interview.

"If that means going after the Taliban not on Wednesday but on Thursday, we will get him then."

De Hoop Scheffer said that while it was impossible to avoid civilian casualties entirely, NATO was "working with weapons load on aircraft to reduce collateral damage".

More than 330 civilians have been killed in operations involving foreign troops in Afghanistan this year, according to Afghan officials and Western aid workers.
Afghan President Hamid Karzai has warned that the casualties could damage support for the presence of foreign forces in his country.

The Financial Times quoted a NATO diplomat as saying that using smaller bombs could cut civilian casualties. "If you put a 250 kg bomb rather than a 500 kg bomb on the plane, that could make a huge amount of difference," the unnamed diplomat said.

The paper quoted other NATO officials as saying the alliance would increasingly leave house-to-house searches to the Afghan army to avoid confrontations.

Seems to pick up on our earlier comments around the same subject. The Guardian is following the same story with a bit more depth.

IraqSlogger: Fighting an Insurgency With F-16s

IraqSlogger has a great post entitled 'Fighting an Insurgency with F-16s: Need to Minimize Collateral Damage Leads to Tough Choices'. It gives some real insight on how limiting collateral damages and respecting IHL can in fact 'complicate' war-fighting. Have copied out the text from Michael Yon's observatino of watching an F-16 and a Shadow circling a house where an insurgent ran after shooting a gun at US forces:

'The F-16 and Shadow both beamed down live images of the house where the terrorists had hidden after firing on US forces. Now was option time. Which weapon to use? There were so many choices: mortars, missiles, and cannons of various sorts, among others. With the enemy hiding in the building, an F-16 and a Shadow orbiting in the black above, both peering down on thermal mode, the Battle Captain asked the Air Force experts,(the JTACs) what weapons the F-16 was carrying. As a JTAC started ticking off a long list, I was thinking, “How in the world to do those little jets carry all that?” In fact, I believe they were reading down the list for two jets flying in the same package. They carry a mixture of weapons cross loaded between the jets so that they will have the black magic needed for a likely situation.
In addition to the F-16’s bombs of various sorts, there was the MLRS rocket system dozens of miles away that had been precisely punching rockets through Baqubah rooftops for days. The MLRS had been flattening buildings that were rigged as giant bombs. There were the 155mm cannons on this base that can hit and flatten anything in Baqubah and beyond. The Apache helicopters could spin up with their rockets and cannons. Infantrymen could just roll in. Or tanks. Or Bradleys. Or Strykers. Even Humvees. The idea was to use just the amount of force to kill the enemy fighters, but leave everyone in the surrounds unscathed, if possible. If that was not possible, often they would simply not fire, but other times they would. Judgment call.

By about 0400, the Battle Captain had decided to use 120mm mortars. As a reference, if a 120mm were to land on a car, the car would be obliterated, but a 120mm would not be enough to flatten a decent house. The first round was shot, and the explosion left a black-hot thermal cloud on the two video screens. The impact looked hundreds of yards off target. Successive shots did not hone it, but got worse. It was starting to look like a turkey shoot, so the Battle Captain ordered the mortars to cease fire and refused to consider using the mortars again for that mission.

They discussed dropping a JDAM (a special type of bomb from one of the jets), but were worried about CD (collateral damage). The idea of a strafe run came up but that would likely cause even more CD, and so that idea was also nixed. Things sure look different from the comfort and safety of the TOC, even though the TOC is still so close to the battlefield that often the explosions can be felt from there. Still it’s like being a thousand miles away by comparison to being with the infantry in the dark and danger. (TOCs do get hit by rockets or mortars sometimes.)

The MLRS rockets and JDAMs were good enough to actually hit buried IEDs, and could easily take the house. The F-16 was carrying at least one concrete bomb—literally, just a bomb made from concrete, like throwing boulders at people—but a JTAC said, “We are not dropping a concrete bomb.” For some reason he didn’t want to just throw a rock. Personally, I don’t like to see bombs explode because it means we are still at war. But a strange feeling came over me: I wanted to see the F-16 drop a boulder on the people that shot at our guys. I knew if the rock hit them, the neighbors would be fine.

While they were discussing how best to kill the guys, the F-16 was running low on fuel. The jets flew low in a show of force and rumbled away. I walked to breakfast at 0515 while they were still plotting. I have no idea if they killed them and if they did, what method they finally settled on. But I know that when there is that kind of careful deliberation in the TOC, combined with excellent combat soldiers on the streets, (the low number of civilian casualties) that otherwise would seem unbelievable are believable.'

Movie Review: No End in Sight

Mountainrunner has a great post on the film No End in Sight, we post it below:

Movie Review: No End in Sight: "

I had the privilege to see Charles Ferguson's movie 'No End in Sight' this evening.'Opening this weekend, tonight was a special screening co-hosted by the Center for American Progress'and'USC's Center on Public Diplomacy. Phil was there and got in a good question. Nick said he would, but I didn't see him.

Charles Ferguson has made a strong picture that will likely get strong traction by not playing on emotion but telling it like it was. Through 3,000 pages of interview transcripts over'70 interviews, plus 40 more in Iraq, he creates a riveting narrative with smart interviews spliced with press conference footage'to make this film. The result is some pretty incredible, and damning,'statements from former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, Ambassador Barbara Bodine, General Jay Garner, Col. Lawrence Wilkerson, Col. Paul Hughes, Nir Rosen, George Packer and others. Splicing in news conferences from Donald Rumsfeld, Richard Cheney, President George W. Bush, and others helped tell the story of OHRA, CPA, and after. Needless to say, Rumsfeld plays a significant role in the movie through his press conferences.

If you'read Imperial Life in the Emerald City,'you already have an idea the charlie foxtrot the movie describes. If you read Packer's The Assassins' Gate, you already have an idea of what the movie's about, especially since it was over dinner with Packer in 2004 that Ferguson decided he needed to make this film.

The movie begins with the post-9/11 attempts to link Saddam with al-Qaeda, through'Shinseki's testimony,'the selection of Chalabi, the creation of OHRA, then the CPA, Bremer's four fateful orders (including de-Baathification and disbanding the military), but stops before the Golden Mosque Bombing. By then, as Ferguson said in the panel discussion after the movie (also on the panel were Greg Treverton from RAND and Nicholas Cull from USC), the die had been cast and the purpose of the movie fulfilled: highlighting the'mismanagement, the ignoring of sage and local advice, and the venality of the policy makers that created the environment of tinder the Golden Mosque bombing ignited.

Because of its strategic focus, there are areas the movie does not delve into, such as the private military contractor debate, save some brief comments and the showing of part of the Aegis Trophy Video. It also does not delve too far into the privatization of the rebuilding, save a few penetrating examples such as Marines working with local Iraqi's to build a frontier fort in 5 months for $200,000 while Parson's required over 17 months and spent well over $1 million more. But in truth, it doesn't need to get into these specifics as it instead focuses on a strategic leadership that created its own reality.

Speaking with Ferguson after the movie, it seems the distributor will put on the website interviews not included in the movie, such one with Larry Diamond. But don't hold your breath, it seems those won't be online for a long time, possibly a year.

This is a must see movie even if you have been paying attention. This is not Michael Moore emotional'hyperbole but a factual account of failed leadership. If you haven't been paying attention, which is probably not many readers of this blog, Ferguson creates an easily digested synopsis of how America managed to create an insurgency in Iraq.'''

Training Coaching US troops on Iraqi culture

As part of their pre-deployment training, US armed forces are enjoying increasingly sophisticated immersion exercises. BBC has a great article on "Mojave Viper", a new pre-deployment cultural training course established to prepare US forces for "irregular warfare" in Iraq. We've posted on these elaborate training exercises in an earlier post, with particular focus on the difficulties in finding appropriate role players.

'Barack Salmoni, deputy director of the centre, says the focus reflects a 2006 military assessment that "developing broader linguistic capability and cultural understanding is critical to prevail in the long war and to meet 21st century challenges".

During the six- to eight-week course, the marines learn about 200 basic words in Arabic - enough to allow them to deal with local people on the ground in Iraq...

But, Mr Salmoni says, the US military became aware of the need to give the troops' mission in Iraq "civil and cultural dimensions" when the Bush administration decided to establish a new Iraqi government.

The US military is trying to teach troops how to build trust with Iraqis.

"We noticed that we had the military tactics but lacked the knowledge of Iraqi laws and traditions so we needed to learn about them all. I am afraid we didn't anticipate all these bifurcations."

Since January, newly established PRTs (Provincial Reconstruction Teams) have increased their operations in Iraqi cities.

The military is becoming more involved in "civil affairs", which entails helping to build local infrastructure.'

Iraq- Danish army evacuates 200 Iraqis

BBC reports that the Danish military has secretly airlifted out 200 Iraqis who had been employed as aides and translators to Danish armed forces serving in Iraq. This is a pleasant surprise, to see armed forces at once rewarding the service of their national staff, while recognizing that such service could put same staff at mortal risk. One only assumes that the families of such staff were also evacuated. The Danish contingent will soon leave Iraq, ending Denmark's contribution to MNFI.

This action stands in stark contrast to the US and UK, who have been- to be polite- 'reluctant' to carry out similar protection of staff whose employment with their forces have put their lives at risk.

Update: a more recent article has the top US diplomat in Iraq proposing to grant immigrant visas to the US to all Iraqis working with the Americans.

Lebanon- Peacekeeping with Hizballah's Help | TIME

TIME has an excellent piece on the challenges facing the relatively successful UNIFIL mission in Lebanon. The peacekeepers are apparently being forced to 'shake hands with the devil'- in order to improve their force protection, and reduce further threats from yet another metaphoric devil. The suggestion is that UNIFIL is obliged to maintain contacts with Hizbollah, in order to protect themselves from further Al-Qaeda attacks:

'The contingents comprising the peacekeeping force known as UNIFIL have good cause for concern. Last month, six Spanish and Colombian UNIFIL soldiers were killed in a bomb ambush, the deadliest attack against the peacekeeping mission in its 29-year history. In a video message released this week, Al-Qaeda deputy leader Ayman al-Zawahiri hailed the attack as "a response against those invading Crusader forces who were occupying a beloved part of the land of Islam". And, UNIFIL officials fear, given the worsening security situation in Lebanon, there could be more attacks on the way. "The major difficulty we are going to face for sure is this kind of terrorist attack because even if we have no idea yet who could be the perpetrators... another attack can come," Major General Claudio Graziano, UNIFIL's commander, told TIME in an interview at his headquarters in the southern coastal village of Naqoura.'


Whatever contacts may exist between UNIFIL and Hizbollah, there was also another roadside bomb that struck a peacekeeping vehicle, the second such incident in a month.

More on AFRICOM

When it rains, it pours- more on AFRICOM:

NYT reports on the announcement of a commander for AFRICOM- pointing out that General William E. Ward is 'the Army's only black four-star general'.

DefenseLink has a more comprehensive press release on the same nomination. DefenseLink now has a dedicated page to AFRICOM.

AFRICOM Update

There's quite a bit being written about AFRICOM, including a few previous posts we've done (also here and here).

- The US Department of State website has a briefing by Ryan Heny, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. The transcript gives a good preamble to the raison d'etre of AFRICOM. ''When it comes to the security or the defense part of this, AFRICOM is not meant to fight wars. It is one that is based on building partnership capability and in the areas of security cooperation. The missions that AFRICOM will emphasize are those of humanitarian assistance, civic action, the professionalism of militaries, assistance in border security and maritime security, and again the area of security cooperation and response to natural disasters.' The proposed comand structure is presetned as being a sort of non-linear/de-centralized HQ with 'nodes' spread across Africa.

- The International Relations and Security Network (ISN) has an exhaustive overview of AFRICOM- 'Questioning AFRICOM's intentions'. The piece explains:
'The Pentagon reportedly plans to establish another dozen bases in the region; in Algeria, Senegal, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Chad, Ghana, Morocco and Tunisia.

But for now, AFRICOM remains an orphan without an African home, with Algeria and Libya rejecting the idea outright, and Morocco being distinctly cool.

The Transition Team will be housed temporarily at the US Army's Kelley Barracks in Stuttgart-Mohringen, Germany until the issue can be resolved. AFRICOM initially will be a sub-unified command, subordinate to EUCOM, also based in Stuttgart, with a projected Initial Operational Capability (IOC) by October 2007. As the Defense Department continues to search for a suitable African host country, high among its concerns is providing for the safety and security of an estimated 500 American personnel and their families who will staff the command.'

- Commentary on a recent WSJ article by UFPPC.

- Also, keep an eye out in September for an upcoming book entitled, 'Beyond Humanitarianism: What You Need to Know About Africa and Why it Matters'. The book will be a compilatoin of recent work by the Council on Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs.

AFRICOM- North Africa Reluctant to Host U.S. Command

A US delegation visiting north Africa found little interest to host the planned African Command, AFRICOM. Close ally Morocco turned down the offcer, while Algeria and Libya not only refused to host the headquarters, but voiced opposition that neighouring countries host it either.

CIMIC in UN & African Peace Operations Resource: CIMIC in UN & African Peace Operations

The following is an excellent resource that I have been meaning to post for some time, available on the website of the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Dispotes (ACCORD):

'This CIMIC in UN & African Peace Operations Manual is a product of all the partners of the African Civil-Military Coordination (ACMC) Programme. It was jointly produced by: the Peace Support Training Center (PSTC)/ German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) Agency in Nairobi, Kenya; the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center (KAIPTC) in Accra, Ghana; the South African National War College (SANWC); and ACCORD.

The ACMC Programme is funded by the Government of Finland. The German Government, through GTZ, supports the participation of the PSTC in the ACMC Programme.'

The manual is an excellent resource, including insructor tools, exercises, policy documents and videos (the bibliography alone is a good resource, includes descriptions of the videos). Further details on the manual, including contacts for the editor are found on the website.