AFGHANISTANICA - Afghanistan’s Security Deterioration in Visual and Quantitative Form

AFGHANISTANICA has a great compilation post looking at Afghanistan’s Security Deterioration in Visual and Quantitative Form.

The post makes clear that the UNDSS report is very focused on the security of humanitarian aid worker:

'The report makes it obvious that the “Anti-Government Elements” aren’t giving aid workers any special treatment. Incidents in 2007 up to early August:

Aid convoys attacked/ambushed/looted: 41.
Aid facilities attacked looted: 29.
Aid workers abducted: 69 (44 Afghans, 25 international).
Later killed by captors: 7 (5 Afghans, 2 foreigners).
Total aid workers killed: 41 (34 Afghans, 7 international).

These numbers are of course much less than deaths suffered by Afghan civilians, police and military and less than the losses by foreign troops. But these NGO workers are desperately needed in Afghanistan, and many of them need to be out in the field to be effective.'

The International Geneva Peacebuilding Guide- An Inventory of Geneva-based capacity and expertise

A new resource was launched this week by the Geneva Centre for Security Policy:

'This conference presents the preliminary findings of an analytical mapping that was undertaken as an integral part of ‘The UN Peacebuilding Commission and International Geneva’ project. Since late 2005, the GCSP and its partners have organised a series of events and public discussions looking at the implications for International Geneva of the work of the UN Peacebuilding Commission. The project has been developed by the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) in collaboration with its partners, the Quaker United Nations Office in Geneva (QUNO), the Graduate Institute for International Studies (HEI/PSIS) and the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). Financial support has been provided by the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) and the Geneva International Academic Network (GIAN).

Since 2006, the project and its partners have engaged a broad range of International Geneva stakeholders in discussions, workshops and public events, aimed at examining the importance of peacebuilding, and the formation of the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). These events and discussions led to a number of findings and recommendations that looked at how International Geneva could influence peacebuilding issues including questions of financing, local ownership, civil society, expertise, analysis, networks and coordination. Please refer to Annex 3 for more details activities of the project to date.

To complement the ongoing discussions and events of 2006, it was decided to undertake an analytical mapping of the peacebuilding capacities and expertise of Geneva-based stakeholders. The results of this mapping have been made public in an online database, the ‘International Geneva Peacebuilding Guide’. This Guide allows users to conduct complex searches and filtering of the data collected from the mapping. The International Geneva Peacebuidlding Guide can be consulted at the following link: http://www.gcsp.ch/e/publications/IGPeaceProject/Guide/index.htm.

The preliminary findings of the project to date are included in this document, and offer a first glimpse of the data collected as of 09 September 2007. We are able to have a comprehensive look at the topography of the International Geneva peacebuilding landscape, the types of organisations present, the countries in which these organisations are engaged, the peacebuilding sectors in which they are active, and the types of activities they undertake. A total of 69 organisations have provided detailed information on on up to 3 peacebuilding sectors where they feel they have the greatest added value, and have also elaborated on how they engage in these priority sectors in the actual and potential PBC focus countries.'



The Guide can be accessed here.

Afghanistan

A German woman was kidnapped in broad daylight from a Kabul bakery popular with foreigners. Her male expatriate colleague was not taken.

Canadian Prime Minister Harper continue to trumpet his armed forces 'humanitarian' work in Afghanistan to his electorate in an attempt to maintain public support for the deployment. Germany is not ruling out further troop contributions for Afghanistan, despite sharing similar Canadian reticence to go down the road of combat deployments.

Great piece entitled, 'Professors on the Battlefield', showcasing the deployment of social scientists with US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan as cultural advisors to Brigade Commanders. If it isn't enough that humanitarians denounce the blurring of lines between military and humanitarian action, the American Anthropological Association recalls the irreparable damage done to academia by 'militarization of the social sciences' that affected their profession in the 60's and 70's. The article captures the worrying comparison to that which humanitarian organizations face in speaking with donors, diplomats and armed forces:

'In recent years, the annual meetings of the American Psychiatric Association, the American Psychological Association and the American Anthropological Association have been dominated by discussion about what ethical responsibilities scholars have in relation to war, terrorism and torture. At such events, Ms. McFate and her rare sympathizers often sound like a lone voice in the wilderness.'

Finally, it seems that PRTs are in season again: a DefenseLink 'good news' piece on PRTs in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan: The World's Worst Suicide Bombers?

Our thanks to TIME for uncovering an excellent essay that asks whether, statistically speaking, the Afghans are not the world's worst suicide bombers?

An excerpt from the essay shows the science and helps us understand there is more than just some black humour at play here:

'Missing the Target

An analysis of the attacks carried out in the last two years reveals a curious fact. In 43% of the bombings conducted last year and in 26 of the 57 bombings traced in this study up to June 15, the only death caused by the bombing was that of the bomber himself. Astoundingly, approximately 90 suicide bombers in this two year period succeeded in killing only themselves. This number exceeds 100 when you factor in those who succeeded in killing only one person in addition to themselves. There was one period in the spring of 2006 (February 20 to June 21) when a stunning 26 of the 36 suicide bombers in Afghanistan (72%) only killed themselves. This puts the kill average for Afghan suicide bombers far below that of suicide bombers in other theaters of action in the area (Israel, Chechnya, Iraq and the Kurdish areas of Turkey). Such unusual bomber-to-victim death statistics are, of course, heartening for both coalition troops—who have described the Afghan suicide bombers as "amateurs"—and the Afghan people—who are usually the victims of the clumsy bombings.

These statistics also represent a uniquely Afghan phenomenon that warrants investigation. In the first portion of this study, it was demonstrated that a part of the reason for this low kill ratio lies in the Taliban's unique targeting sets (Terrorism Monitor, March 1). As Pashtuns with a strong code (Pashtunwali) that glorifies acts of martial valor and badal (revenge), the Afghan suicide bombers are more prone to hit "hard" military targets than callously obliterate innocent civilians in the Iraqi fashion. On the rare occasions where there have been high casualty bombings of Afghan civilians, they tend to have been carried out by Arab al-Qaeda bombers.'

Aegis Charitable Foundation- Private Security Companies- Low Cost, High Impact Assistance

Had originally intended to post on a vehicle of British-based security comapny Aegis Specialist Risk Management having been hit by a roadside bomb in Basra.

While visiting the Aegis website, gave a full read to the profile of Aegis' founder, Tim Spicer. Found a glimpse of Aegis [private security companies in general] that hadn't seen before:

'He [Tim Spicer] created the Aegis Charitable Foundation in 2004, a registered UK charity which provides direct assistance to communities through low cost, high impact civil affairs projects. Tim’s effort and support of this charity not only significantly helps communities in great need having suffered from conflict, but has also enhanced the ability of Reconstruction Operations in Iraq to actually implement their programmes successfully. Tim’s concept for the charity has been to carefully target projects that communities need and also want. The Foundation has therefore concentrated its efforts on building relationships with local tribal leaders and communities to provide clean water projects, inoculation programmes, school and health clinic equipment and smaller items such as toys, clothes and shoes. Tim has now expanded the Foundation’s arena to include Afghanistan.'



Sure enough, the Aegis Charitable Foundation enjoys its own pages to show off its good work- replete with images of (presumably) Tim himself delivering life-saving supplies of soccer balls to Iraqi children. [It is recommended to scroll through their projects- it is so rare to see humanitarian marketing photos of the benevolent aid-providing staff and their interlocutors with their faces blurred... Needless to say, the smiling beneficiaries are all lucky enough to have their faces shown without blurring...] Wonder if Aegis considers this as part of their Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) strategy?

Northrop Grumman Awarded Contract for Global Training of Peacekeeping Forces

Northrop Grumman was awarded the contract for the Global Peace Operations Initaitive (GPOI- more on the initiative here and here). The $200 million US contract over five years is part of the US Department of State initiative to build worldwide capacity for peacekeeping operations. L3 Communications MPRI was also awarded a similar contract.

As the press release makes clear, Northrop Grumman has already been providing similar training under the ACOTA program- African Contingency Operations Training Assistance- since the 1990s.

Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa

The Congressional Research Service published a report entitled 'Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa.' Ths is a great resource that is worth a read. The appendices include a history of US military involvement in Africa.

China pledges $20bn for Africa

'China intends to provide about $20bn in infrastructure and trade financing to Africa during the next three years, eclipsing many of the continent’s traditional big donors by a single pledge.'

This article might not seem entirely germane to the civil-military question, but in light of the renewed US focus on Africa through AFRICOM, the Chinese have upped the ante in one foul swoop, and through civilian, financial means.

China's moves haven't gone unnoticed by other donors. 'The World Bank has accused China of financing projects rejected by others because of environmental concerns and rights groups say it lends without regard to standards on governance or corruption.' Sour grapes? The real concern, beyond mere competition, appears to be that China's preference is towards bilateral and not multilateral development initiatives.

The Pentagon's New Africa Command

The Council of Foreign Relations has an excellent backgrounder on the New African Command (AFRICOM) announced by President Bush in February.

The article highlights some of the differences between the future AFRICOM and existing Commands:

- 'The Pentagon stresses that Africom’s primary mission will be preventing “problems from becoming crises, and crises from becoming conflicts.”'

- 'It resembles the mission statement of other regional commands, but “the difference is that building partnerships is first and foremost of the strategies which is not necessarily the case with other commands,” says Ambassador Loftis.'
An interesting statement, as the authors frame it, AFRICOM will be more of a diplomacy-development Command, with focus being heavy on cooperation activities with national armed forces, and only a limited capacity for 'kinetic' military operations.

- 'Though Africom will be led by a top-ranking four-star military general, unlike other regional commands, its deputy commander will be a State Department official... Some defense officials say that Africom could function like the interagency task force within Southern Command; in that structure, interagency members have the authority to make decisions without consulting Washington.'
This mixing up of military and civilian staff and agendas is an experiment at a scale not yet attempted by others. Will be curious to see how this aspect is fleshed out over the coming months.

Research- Improving NATO-NGO Relations in Crisis Response Operations

The NATO Defense College has published a great article on Improving NATO-NGO relations. The conclusion of the article is an interesting- about face to the trend of mission integration- the author proposes that a relationship of complementarity will yield the best results, and not strict integration.

PCR Project- The Danish Approach to State-Building

Our friends at the PCR Project posted on a recently published article on The Danish Approach to State-Building:

Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, head of the Research Unit, Political Violence, Terrorism and Radicalization, at the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), has just published her findings on the Danish military and its approach to state-building. Full report is available here.

The research findings are provocative- Dalgaard-Neilsen concludes that deployed Danish military units are evaluated as conducting good reconstruction support tasks, when measured against basic principles of good development work.

Exec summary:
'The Danish armed forces, together with the armed forces of other nations, have come under political pressure to accept a range of state-building tasks, including support for reconstruction. This is the case in areas such as Iraq and Afghanistan where few civilian and humanitarian organisations are willing to operate. This report analyses how the Danish armed forces have approached and prioritised reconstruction support and asks how their performance might be improved. It is based on empirical evidence collected over a period of five months of “embedded” research, during which the author took part in the daily activities of deployed Danish units in Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. It points out how the Danish units assigned reconstruction support tasks are neglected in a number of ways by their own organisation and show how they nevertheless perform well as measured against basic principles of good development work. It draws on Edgar H. Schein’s theory of organisational culture to explain this pattern and shows how civil tasks, while clashing with some aspects of the culture of Danish armed forces – notions about mission and means to fulfi l the mission – are compatible with other parts – notions about human beings and human relations. The report closes with a discussion of which political, organisation, and educational initiatives would enhance the current performance of reconstruction support tasks.'

Refugees International- Security Sector Reform Must Focus on Protection of Civilians

Refugees International (RI) sent a statement to the UN Security Council on February 16, 2007, appealing for a coordinated UN approach to Security Sector Reform (SSR). The 'punchline' of their appeal was that SSR must place more focus on the protection of civilians.

RI makes some excellent points in their piece, notably on the rationale behind their appeal:
'Regenerating and strengthening of the security sector post-conflict have been issues of UN concern for some time. Modern integrated UN peacekeeping missions incorporate military, political, humanitarian and development actors. Like the more traditional peacekeeping missions, these multidimensional missions still fulfill short-term stabilization and protection duties. But today peacekeepers are also expected to lay the ground work for long-term development and a self-sustaining peace. The weak or corrupted security institutions that make peacekeeping necessary in the first place must be developed into strong, accountable institutions that protect civilians, ensure stability, and create the necessary conditions for lasting peace, security, and rule of law.'

Curious as to how these initiatives on SSR link into the UN Peacebuilding Commission.

The Fog of Humanitarianism: Collective Action Problems and Learning-Challenged Organizations

The Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding have an timely and insightful article on humanitarian action in their latest issue. The author's conclusions are particularly insightful:

'This essay explores humanitarian action, and by effect post-conflict state-
building, in the so-called new wars of the post-cold war period especially the targeting of civilians, the proliferation of non-state actors, and the perils of war economies. The host of reactions by aid agencies, termed ‘new humanitarianisms’, has called into question traditional operating principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence while the system has experienced dramatic increases in the number of organizations and available funds. Arguing that too little institutional learning has yet occurred, the authors call for changing the culture of aid agencies and investing in information gathering and sharing, policy analysis, and planning. In an era when reflection time is as valuable as reaction time, they stress the need to develop a humanitarian equivalent of military science.'

Humanitarian-military dialogue- Humanitarian Practice Network

The Humanitarian Practice Network has a forum for online exchange- there is a lively short exchange around the complementarity and limits of the humanitarian-military dialogue and relationship.

The there authors make very good cases from their respective points of view. The editorial is certainly worth a read, as is a later post by Eva von Oelrich, entitled 'Coopted by the UN? Time for NGOs to take up the challenge'

Resource- Civil-Military Relations

Smartpowerblog has an excellent resource page, with links and references on the subject of civil-military relations, writ large.

Introducing The 404s: Military's Lamest Websites

Granted, this post is only tangentially related to the subject at hand, but this contest being run by the folks over at Wired magazine's DANGER ROOM have come up with a novel idea: a contest to find the absolutely worst military website.

The rationale:
'The federal government started building websites for its various agencies back in the mid-90s. The idea was to better inform the public -- and to share information across bureaucratic silos. At least, that was the theory.
In practice, those high-minded ambitions have rarely, if ever, been met. That's especially true at the Department of Defense. Many military websites barely have any content at all. And what content they have is years out of date.'

Sarcasm aside, the post does make a good point that is often over-looked: that information sharing actually helps armed forces, the obsession with security classification aside.

One final point- to level the playing field, one has to wonder if the websites of civilian humanitarian and development agencies are in any way more informative than the average military website. While the graphics may be better, is if often incredibly difficult to find concrete information what agencies are doing for whom, where.

Resource- Civil-military cooperation Blog

Recently discovered a blog entitled 'Civil-military cooperation- The website for research into the field of civil-military cooperation'. The site includes some excellent links, abstracts and original publications- definitely worth a visit.

Confusion in the Margins: Narrow or Wide? Saving Lives or Building peace?

An insightful piece by Antonio Donini, Senior Researcher at the Feinstein International Center.

He looks at the question of how wide the definition of humanitarianism should be- a narrowly defined niche only for civilian do-gooders who prize neutrality and independence? Or, as he succinctly puts it:

"Thus, humanitarianism is in the eye of the beholder. It is self-defined. The term is ambiguous in that a diverse range of actors claim to operate under a banner that is used to justify a multitude of interventions. There is no formal standard to which organizations, who see themselves as humanitarian, can be held to account. This is one of the problems: there is not one humanitarianism; there are many. And, quite naturally, there is a range of views on whether humanitarian action should be narrowly defined or broad in scope."

Antonio will be presenting his paper at the upcoming ICVA Conference: A Contribution to the Debate, in Geneva, Switzerland, 2 February 2007.

'...the military no longer understands what business it is in.'

An interesting clip from the blog of an officer in Iraq, posted on blackfive.net. With some sarcasm, it states that the US military simply does not know what business it is in any more, focusing on robust policing tactics and not war-fighting. It presents a very 'policy' way of operating in Iraq, with what must be astronomically high operating risks:

"In simple terms, the military no longer understands what business it is in. We're in the capturing business, not the killing business. We've gravitated to (heavily armed) police tactics because we are rightfully focused on the population, no matter what they think of us, even while fighting an enemy that thrives on collateral death. So we don't overpressure whole city blocks; we roll in in Humvees, accept the risks each screwed up neighborhood poses, and then walk the streets. We don't enter houses with grenades; each day we knock on perhaps fifty doors, waiting on the street, exposed, until the nervous owner unlocks the gate. We use sting operations (ambushes), neighborhood watches (presence patrolling), snitches, and DUI checkpoints (vehicle searches). We don't shoot unarmed enemy combatants. The Iraqi soldiers hunt them down like seasoned detectives and zip-tie them. These pu#$&es never fight back. Once detained, we treat them better than my college roommates treated each other.
The problem is, we haven't armed our soldiers with the necessary tools to fight this crucial stage of the war and at the highest levels we have abdicated responsibility where we most need to embrace it..."

Reconsidering Civ-Mil Relations in Disasters- US editorial

An excellent article that starts to pose interesting questions about the limits of authority and participation of the military in domestic affairs:

'This trend toward increased involvement of the US military in domestic affairs is at odds with healthy civil-military relations. In addition, officers traditionally have expressed the fear that involving the military in domestic tasks will undermine the war fighting capabilities of their units and cause their "fighting spirit" to decline.'